Arguably, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are influenced by a wide range of both internal and external factors. Perhaps most critical among the exogenous forces operating on MNEs are those exerted by state and other key institutional actors in host countries. Crucially, academic research conducted to date offers little data about how MNEs use their CSR activities to strategically manage their relationship with those actors in order to gain legitimisation advantages in host countries. This paper addresses that gap by exploring interactions between external institutional pressures and firm-level CSR activities, which take the form of community initiatives, to examine how MNEs develop their legitimacy-seeking policies and practices. In focusing on a developing country, Sri Lanka, this paper provides valuable insights into how MNEs instrumentally utilise community initiatives in a country where relationshipbuilding with governmental and other powerful non-governmental actors can be vitally important for the long-term viability of the business. Drawing on neo-institutional theory and CSR literature, this paper examines and contributes to the embryonic but emerging debate about the instrumental and political implications of CSR. The evidence presented and discussed here reveals the extent to which, and the reasons why, MNEs engage in complex legitimacy-seeking relationships with Sri Lankan host institutions.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in multinational enterprises (MNEs) has been the focus of scholarly research for some time (Husted and Allen, 2006; Mohan, 2006; Rodriguez et al, 2006) .
Nevertheless, answers to a critical question, "Does corporate social responsibility (CSR) help multinational enterprises (MNEs) to gain legitimacy among host-country institutional actors?" have been distinctly lacking. While some scholarship (Su and He, 2010; Zhao, 2012) concerned with CSR has answered 'Yes' to this question, other questions about 'How', 'Why' and 'To what extent' multinationals gain legitimacy via their CSR policies and practices remain poorly addressed. In this paper we respond to this gap in the literature and, in the process, contend that when MNEs operate in countries where the state exerts considerable power and control over businesses, such as in Sri Lanka, CSR can prove to be an important legitimisation tool by which MNEs can gain recognition (and support) from the state and other institutional actors (Feng and Wang, 2010) .
Promoted as an 'ideal way' through which MNEs can engage in ethical behaviour, activities labelled as 'corporate social responsibility' vary considerably, ranging from involvement with communities (Grayson, 1993; Muthuri, 2008; Seitanidi and Ryan, 2007) to establishing environment management systems (Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Rondinelli and Berry, 2000) .
Existing research does furnish evidence of the influence exerted by various institutions, such as governments, on other organisational practices of multinationals (Geppert et al., 2003; Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007) , however, there is a paucity of research which examines the forms and processes of legitimacy-seeking behaviour of MNEs via their CSR policies and practices (Oliver, 1991; Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Trullen and Stevenson, 2006) . Given the recent resurgence of interest in MNEs' role as 'global political actors' (Scherer et al., 2009) , who are engaged in the development of a global-level CSR agenda (Detomasi, 2007; Matten and Crane, 2005; Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2006) , it has become critically important to understand how MNEs act politically, especially in a state-dominated developing countries such as Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka provides a particularly revealing context in which to study interactions between MNEs, the state and other institutions, in relation to the formers' legitimacy-seeking behaviour. Sri Lanka's recent history is one of a civil war in which a peace-settlement was secured in 2009 under controversial circumstances that are still being questioned by the global community (BBC, 2013) .
Economically, Sri Lanka has aggressively pursued the development of a market-economy through an extensive market liberalisation programme dating from 1977 to 1994 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010) . The new economic policies adopted by the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL), guided by Mahinda Chintana, known as 'Mahinda's thoughts' (GOSL, 2013) , which is the incumbent Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapakse's political manifesto, have raised concerns within the business community (United States Foreign Commercial Service, 2013) . The Sri Lankan government's intervention to suspend the privatization of loss-making state enterprises and the promotion of state control within key industries, as well as the re-nationalisation of thirty-seven private businesses under the auspices of the 'Revival of underperforming enterprises and underutilised assets Act' of 2011 (Aneez and Sirilal, 2011) , have created an uncertain policy environment for businesses. The perception amongst investors is that the Sri Lankan government is consolidating its dominant political power amidst a revival of Sinhala nationalism (Hull and Sirilal, 2011) .
Nevertheless, Sri Lanka has a long history of corporate philanthropy, notably led by individual values and actions rather than formal corporate CSR practices (Mayer and Salih, 2006) . The voluntary adoption of CSR has steadily grown within the corporate sector in recent years (ACCA, 2005) with an increase in the voluntary reporting of CSR practices amongst public limited companies (Rajapakse, 2009 ) and global subsidiaries (Beddewela and Herzig, 2013) . These corporate efforts are paralleled by other institutional actors' actions to promote CSR in the country.
Such attempts have included inter alia the establishment of CSR Awards. For example, in recent years, we have witnessed the introduction of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) of Sri Lanka's awards for 'Sustainability Reporting' (ACCA, 2007) , the National Chamber of Commerce of Sri Lanka's 'Business Excellence Awards' 1 (NCCSL, 2010) , and the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce's annual award scheme for the 'Ten Best Corporate Citizens' 2 (CCC, 2010) .
In addition, some of Sri Lanka's leading companies have become signatories to the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) principles. Industry-wide initiatives such as 'Garments without guilt', promoted by Sri Lanka Apparel (SLA), the industry body for Sri Lanka's apparel industry (SLA, 2013) , have also made a significant contribution towards changing corporate perceptions of CSR in the country. The GOSL and its various departments have also made a concerted effort to incorporate CSR into a public-private partnership model, with the establishment of the National
Centre for Economic Development (NCED) (NCED, 2008) . By adopting a 'participatory' approach to the development of national economic policies and plans via the creation of 'Private-Public Partnerships', the overall objective of NCED has been to align business objectives with the Millennium Development Goals 3 (UN, 2009) with the aim that effective and progressive social and economic development may be achieved in Sri Lanka.
Collectively these efforts have resulted in some important community initiatives implemented by MNEs' subsidiaries operating in Sri Lanka, in partnership with various institutional actors, including the GOSL. These consist, for example, of long-term projects such as the Sustainable Agricultural Project (SADP) implemented by a tobacco MNE, aimed at eradicating rural poverty in Given the context and conditions outlined above, in this paper we focus on firm-level legitimacyseeking behaviour. However, rather than examining the external regulatory and policy environment in isolation, we also explore the internal strategy context. In so doing we investigate the ways in which MNEs use their CSR activities to engage in legitimacy-seeking behaviour. In summary, our study contributes to neo-institutional theory and CSR literature in the following ways: firstly, our research adds to the relatively small but emerging body of empirical research concerned with CSR that adopts a developing-country perspective in Asia (Chapple and Moon, 2007) ; and secondly, our paper provides further insights that permit a greater understanding of 'legitimacy' in neoinstitutional theory. By examining a study within the context of CSR we reveal the inter-play which occurs between MNE subsidiaries and key institutional actors in relation to gaining legitimacy through the use of CSR in developing countries (Oliver, 1991) . Thirdly, our study advances the previously deficient knowledge and understanding of the political behaviour of MNEs in relation to host-county governments, and reveals insights into its cooperative dimensions (Fransen, 2013; Menzies and Orr, 2010) . Finally, our investigation responds to calls to develop an alternative view of organisational strategic and management practices, using a neo-institution theory based view (Peng et al, 2008) , especially in relation to MNEs (Leung et al., 2005) .
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly examines the CSR literature that is most salient to our research, followed by a discussion of isomorphism and legitimacy within neoinstitutional theory. Section 3 presents the methods used to collect and analyse the data in this study. Section 4 reports the main findings in relation to the ten MNE subsidiaries studied and their use of CSR in Sri Lanka. Section 5 provides a discussion of our findings and this is followed by the final section which concludes the paper and suggests viable future research avenues.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
In this section we briefly explore two main bodies of academic literature that are most pertinent to our research: firstly, scholarship concerned with CSR; and secondly, neo-institutional theory which proposes ideas about isomorphism and legitimacy. We turn first to literature about CSR.
Corporate Social Responsibility: discretionary, strategic or mandated?
One long running debate in CSR literature focuses on questions which ask whether companies should adopt discretionary CSR (Carroll, 1979; Wartick and Mahon, 1994) or strategic CSR (Husted, 2001; Husted and Allen, 2007; Husted and Salazar, 2006) or whether they should be compelled or regulated to do so (Fairbrass 2011; Fairbrass and Zueva-Owens, 2012) . The roots of this debate can be traced back to an early definition of CSR (Carroll 1979: p 500) where the phenomenon is deemed to comprise 'economic, legal, ethical and discretionary' responsibilities.
Conventionally, this discussion explores whether corporate community initiatives, or those CSRrelated activities which companies use exclusively to engage with their wider local-community (or social) stakeholders, have been treated as a discretionary or voluntary philanthropic activity or some alternative type of behaviour (Saiia et al., 2003) . Crucially, over the course of time, research has indicated that if managed effectively, community initiatives could assist companies in retaining and even increasing their customers (Levy, 2005; Simmons and Becker-Olsen, 2006) , fostering a sense of commitment from employees (De Gilder et al., 2005; Grayson, 1993; Zappala, 2004) and strengthening their corporate reputation as a 'caring business' (Arendt and Brettel, 2010; Brammer and Millington, 2005; Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Hillenbrand and Money, 2007) . As a result, community initiatives have come to be perceived more as strategic activities rather than voluntary or discretionary (Saiia et al., 2003) : that is to say, not legally mandated but strategically essential.
Whilst, previously, corporate community initiatives (or corporate charitable activities) were substantially determined by the profits and values of their business owners, it is argued that today these are influenced more by the needs and requirements of other powerful stakeholders (Brammer and Millington, 2004; Veser, 2004) , including the state (Zhao, 2012) . Therefore, in effect, companies are not implementing community initiatives simply for ethical or philanthropic reasons but for more instrumental reasons such as long-term profit maximisation (Navarro, 1988) through the creation of competitive and comparative advantages for the firm (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Porter and Kramer, 2002; Waddock and Boyle, 1995) and in order to gain socio-political legitimacy (Hemphill, 1999) from powerful institutional stakeholders. Although previous studies have examined the potential instrumental benefits of corporate community initiatives (Fooks et al., 2013; Saiia et al., 2003) , very few studies (but see Zhao, 2012) investigate how companies exploit these initiatives to seek legitimacy from the state and other key institutional actors. Some studies, such as the one conducted by Su and He (2010) , have shown that firms engage in philanthropy to maximise the firm's benefits, not in the form of an immediate economic return, but rather in order to maximise their 'political return', which is designed to circumvent regulation or seek to be better protected from government intervention or legislation. Under such circumstances, any mismanagement of CSR as part of a firm-level strategy could thus weaken the firms' competitive position relative to their rivals in the country, and undermine their legitimacy, which in turn could result in a long-term disadvantage for the firm (Baron, 2001 
Neo-Institutional theory: Isomorphism and Legitimacy
Neo-institutional theory defines 'legitimacy' as "the degree of cultural support for an organisation" (Meyer and Scott, 1983: p 201 (Hamann and Acutt, 2010) . By engaging in legitimacy-seeking behaviour, companies usually intend to secure and maintain access to valued resources from key institutional constituents ultimately leading to the organisation's future survival (Sonpar et al., 2009 ).
Organisations may adopt two main strategies to gain legitimacy: they could passively conform to isomorphic pressures arising from external institutions (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1983; Powell and Di Maggio, 1991) or they could proactively engage in managing these institutional pressures by adopting certain legitimacy-seeking strategies (Pfeffer, 1978; Oliver, 1991; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995 These three types of isomorphism can collectively provide three related but distinct bases for legitimacy which institutional actors could confer upon the organisations. Legitimacy can be achieved by conforming to the law of the land (through coercive isomorphism), via moral compliance (through normative isomorphism) and/or through adopting a common frame of reference or definition of the situation (through mimetic isomorphism) (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991) .
Traditionally most CSR models, such as the corporate social performance model (Wood, 1991; Wartick and Cochran, 1985) , and theories such as stakeholder management (Freeman, 1984) , advise companies to actively engage in CSR and manage external social issues effectively. From this perspective companies cannot simply comply with institutional pressures in order to gain legitimacy: they also need to proactively develop CSR activities specifically targeted towards legitimacy-building. This proactive approach is also advocated by other authors such as Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Oliver (1991) and Suchman (1995) , who argue that organisations need to strategically (and instrumentally) manage their institutional environments, by "…adopting managerial perspectives instrumentally to manipulate and deploy evocative symbols in order to garner societal support." (Suchman, 1995: 572) .
Under such circumstances, legitimacy becomes a 'cultural currency' and an 'operational resource' (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) , which can facilitate the capture of intermediate inputs (of both an economic and non-economic nature) from external constituents, thereby reducing transaction costs for the firm (Boddewyn, 2012) .
Prior research has shown that MNEs exercise managerial agency through the adoption of range of strategies such as seeking market leadership and lobbying for regulatory change (Holtbrugge and Berg, 2004) . The implementation of CSR by subsidiaries has also been recognised by some authors (See Fooks et al., 2013; Lawrence, 2010; Miller, 2008) as the deliberate use of managerial agency to gain legitimisation. Empirical studies have furnished substantial evidence to indicate that companies use CSR instrumentally to achieve a range of objectives including the desire to generate new business opportunities (Hahn, 2009) , to project an image of positive social performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) , to mitigate or off-set poor social performance in other areas (Chen et al., 2010) , to protect companies from negative forms of regulation and/or help them meet stakeholder expectations, which ultimately can result in financial gains for companies in either the short-or long-term (Polishchuk, 2009) . However, these studies examine CSR in a broader context and fail to explore how companies specifically use CSR as part of legitimacy-seeking strategies.
At this juncture we draw on Oliver's (1991) typology that identifies five possible strategic responses, each one equating to a different level or degree of active agency towards external institutional pressures ranging from little resistance to outright defiance. The responses include:
'Acquiescence', which refers to adherence by the company to rules, values and norms within the institutional environment. Such acquiescence depends also on the intention of the organisation to conform to institutional pressures and importantly its expectation that conformity will result in the fulfilment of its self-serving interests. 'Manipulation' which involves the company in actively seeking to change or exert power over institutional demands, is considered to be the most active response to institutional pressures. It is also an opportunistic strategic response, in that, organisations engage in trying to alter or control institutional constituents and their criteria of evaluation in order to achieve legitimisation. 'Compromise' represents a certain level of compliance with institutional actors' requirements where organisations actively demonstrate conformity to and accommodation of the norms, values and rules promoted by institutional actors.
However, Oliver (1991) argues that it only results in partial compliance, as compared to a strategy of 'Acquiescence', as organisations are more interested in promoting their own self-interests. In contrast to the three strategies discussed above, the strategies of 'Avoidance' and 'Defiance' are used by organisations to either circumvent and/or reject institutional pressures. 'Avoidance', therefore, is concerned with organisational attempts to evade the need for conformity to institutional norms and expectations, while 'Defiance' consists of active resistance by the company or even unequivocal rejection of institutional pressures. We argue that Oliver's typology, with its framework for evaluating legitimacy-seeking behaviour, provides a powerful analytical tool with which to research how MNEs use CSR activities to seek legitimacy from host-country institutional actors.
Moreover, while previous studies have examined the role of CSR in legitimacy-seeking behaviour of companies (Palazzo and Richter, 2005; Trullen and Stevenson, 2006) , the focus has been on exploring the external regulatory and external policy environment, rather than the internal firmlevel strategy context. In this context, previous studies have found evidence indicative of the pressures exerted by host-country institutions on MNE subsidiaries' CSR, such as increased local adaptation of their CSR (Barin Cruz and Boehe, 2010; Kolk et al., 2010; Yang and Rivers, 2009 ).
Those studies which have looked at firm-level legitimacy-seeking strategies have focused on other CSR-related practices such as corporate governance (Selekler-Goksen and Yildirim Oktem, 2009; Judge et al., 2008; Mason et al., 2007) , environmental management practices (See for example Hoffman, 1999; Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Jennings and Zandbergen, 1995; Clemens and Douglas, 2006) , or corporate communications (Castello and Lozano, 2011) . Therefore, it is a challenge to find empirical studies that show the forms and processes of legitimacy-seeking behaviour of MNEs' subsidiaries who use CSR in the form of community initiatives. We address this gap in the research by exploring how MNEs in Sri Lanka make use of such approaches. We examine both the external and internal forces operating and explore whether firms utilise the sorts of responses proposed by Oliver (1991) above as a reaction to the coercive, normative or mimetic pressures identified by the authors referred to above (Powell and Di Maggio, 1991; Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1983) .
The research framework for the study
The body of literature reviewed above suggests that domestic, host-country institutional isomorphism can exert considerable pressure on MNEs to adopt CSR activities which are compliant with local or host-country requirements. In countries such as Sri Lanka, where the state control and power has been increasing steadily, these pressures may very well arise mostly from the central government itself (Zhao, 2012; Yang and Rivers, 2009) , as coercive pressures. MNEs' subsidiaries are also likely to face normative pressures, specifically those arising from professional and industrial bodies, compelling them to engage in CSR practices (Amran and Haniffa, 2011) .
Although mimetic pressures have been identified as being less influential in relation to MNE subsidiaries' CSR strategies (Amran and Siti-Nabiha, 2009; Beddewela and Herzig, 2013) , it could still be considered to be an important institutional pressure. However, our argument here is that while MNEs do face these host-country isomorphic pressures in relation to their CSR practices, these MNEs are not inherently passive actors themselves. Rather, we argue that multinational firms are capable of taking proactive measures, so as to engage in a dynamic way with these institutional pressures and pursue effective legitimacy-seeking strategies. We recognise that the firms could employ a range of different types or kinds of CSR initiatives with the objective of building longterm relationships with the state and other important institutional actors, so that ultimately their survival in the country can be assured (Fooks et al., 2013) .
In our case study, we focus particularly on community initiatives as a form of CSR. More specifically, our research explores how the interaction between MNEs and other societal institutions takes place in Sri Lanka and how CSR initiatives are used by MNEs in their broad legitimacyseeking strategies (as illustrated in figure 1 ). Drawing on the literature above, therefore, we pose and address two key questions.
 How do the host-country institutional actors influence the CSR activities of MNEs?
 How do MNEs use CSR activities to seek legitimacy from host-country institutional actors?
Having outlined our conceptual approach in this paper, we now turn to examine the research methods used in order to address these questions.
METHODS
Given the lack of existing empirical research in our chosen area and the need to understand the specific context within which CSR led legitimacy-seeking behaviour takes place, an exploratory qualitative method was chosen (Guba and Lincoln, 1985; Silverman, 2005) . More specifically, in order to investigate how different MNE subsidiaries operating in a developing country engage in legitimacy-seeking behaviour using CSR, we used a case-study research strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009 ) consisting of a multiple case design. This approach was chosen to enable and assist cross-case analysis and synthesis (Ibid). Data was collected from ten selected cases (i.e. MNE subsidiaries) in one specific host country (i.e. Sri Lanka) to minimise host country effects (such as cultural, economic, social and political factors) which would have rendered comparison of cases difficult or less meaningful otherwise. We also collected data from key institutional actors, using in-depth interviews, in order to explore how they seek to influence the CSR activities of MNEs operating in the country.
Data Collection
Using purposive sampling (Silverman, 2005) , the subsidiaries were selected on the basis of the nature of the data required. No parameters were set in terms of subsidiary size, sector or number of employees when selecting the subsidiaries. This complemented the exploratory nature of the study.
The only selection criterion that we used was to the conduct research focusing on MNE subsidiaries based in Sri Lanka who were actively engaging in CSR.
As there was no commonly accepted or available measurement for recognising the degree of CSR contributions made by Sri Lankan-based MNEs, subsidiaries which were listed as being among the 'Most Respected Entities in Sri Lanka' (LMD, 2008) provided the basis for our sample selection.
The ranking is commissioned by the country's leading business magazine, the Lanka Monthly Digest (LMD), and uses a survey of 800 business people attached to organisations within the limits of Greater Colombo who rank the most respected companies in terms of various aspects, one of which is CSR. Hence, from an overall ranking of 100 companies, the first ten MNE subsidiaries with the highest rankings were selected for research purposes. We also wanted to compare companies from different industries, ranging from those where there was high state control to industries with low or no state control. Table 1 years of experience and five companies have been operating in Sri Lanka for more than 70 years (in three of these cases, for more than 100 years). Apart from the corporate managers, senior staff from eight institutional actors representing a range of key institutions, including the GOSL were also interviewed. The objective was to explore their interactions with the ten case study companies. Table 2 provides details about these institutional interviewees including their institutional affiliations.
The corporate managers, together with the respondents from the institutional actors, were interviewed using an interview guide. The key themes used for interviewing the subsidiary managers comprised the following: the scope and extent of engagement in CSR; the company's motives for engaging in CSR; and the firm's engagement with host-country institutional actors and their reciprocal influence. The institutional actors were interviewed about their overall engagement with the ten companies, and their influence over the firms in relation to their CSR activities.
Although the interview guides were followed as a means of maintaining a strong focus throughout the interviews, these did not restrict the use of probing questions needed to gather more detailed information from the interviewees. All the interviews were conducted face-to-face at the offices of the MNEs. Each interview lasted between 30 and 60 minutes and all respondents were assured of anonymity. Further data was also gathered from the published corporate social reports (and related publications) to furnish additional detail about the CSR activities of the MNEs.
Data analysis
During the data collection all thirty-seven interviews were digitally recorded and then transferred to computer as mp3 files. All interview transcripts were coded and a database was created by using NVivo10. As advised by Yin (2009) , such an activity enhances the reliability of the study and makes the analytic process more transparent and accountable (Fielding, 2002) . In the initial stage, transcripts were read several times, together with notes made during the interviews.
Following Miles and Huberman (1994) , we undertook a cross-case analysis of the initial themes which were developed by using open coding. In other words we undertook a scrutiny of transcripts to produce initial codes (Strauss, 1996) which categorises the data (Flick, 2002) and allowed overall features of the phenomenon under study to be identified and categorised. During the cross-case analysis, we remained mindful of the unique context of each subsidiary being analysed. For example, we were aware of the firm's and the industry's characteristics, the level of engagement in CSR by the company, and the nature of the interactions with institutional actors and the GOSL.
The cross-case analysis enabled us to identify patterns that were strongly attributable to subsidiaries operating in specific industries in Sri Lanka. We then further analysed these initial patterns using the interview data obtained from the institutional actors. Our immersion in the data enabled us to find key themes and then to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the interaction between institutions and subsidiary CSR activities, leading to the generation of a more refined analysis of external institutional pressures operating on the CSR activities of the MNEs' subsidiaries and how they, in turn, developed their legitimacy-seeking strategies via their CSR activities.
FINDINGS
In summary, we found that the external institutional pressures on the CSR activities of the ten subsidiaries varied according to the level of government control over an industry and the power of the institutional actor exerting the pressure. The subsidiaries in turn used CSR activities pragmatically and instrumentally and engaged in distinctive legitimacy-seeking strategies. We examine these findings in more depth below.
External Pressures and Intervening Factors
All ten subsidiaries indicated that there were external pressures which influenced different aspects of their CSR activities. For example, in deciding whether to partner a non-governmental or governmental institution and how they prioritised their company's CSR projects was a product of such external pressures. Three of the subsidiaries identified the government as the most forceful source of external pressure, indicating that the government's impact on them ranged from legal and regulatory pressures to demands for partnerships with government institutions to minimise political risks (see Table 3 ). The quotations below exemplify the degree of pressure exerted by the government on these firms. 
Further investigation of the specific industries where these three subsidiaries operated showed that these were significantly controlled by the government (see Table 4 ). For example, the Tobacco
Company operates as a monopoly in Sri Lanka, which is extensively taxed as well as highly regulated by the government 5 . Tobacco Company's business sustainability, and specifically its ability to maintain its monopoly position, is completely dependent on its acceptance as a key contributor to the GOSL's revenue and development initiatives. The Nutrition Company was also dependent on the GOSL for its business profitability, as the majority of their products are milkbased products which are imported from abroad and which are also price controlled in Sri Lanka 6 .
The Cement Company also faced both price controls and import restrictions on their cement products by the GOSL (and related ministries).
Our evidence further reveals that the government of Sri Lanka is perceived to be actively applying coercive pressure on the CSR activities of those companies operating in those industries which are state-controlled. This finding is unsurprising. However, we also found that the Sri Lankan government also applies normative type pressures, as well as coercive pressures, to private sector companies via the National Centre for Economic Development (NCED), which promotes increased public-private engagement:
"What the government does is to discuss policy issues, The external pressures on CSR activities of the other seven companies mostly arose from nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) including local trade associations (see Table 5 ). For example, interviews revealed that NGOs or third sector organisations such as the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce (CCC), the National Chamber of Commerce (NCCSL), professional bodies such as the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), and global institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) were major influences on the CSR activities of the MNEs.
-
----------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE -----------------------------------------------
The In summary, the above analysis indicates that multinationals in Sri Lanka face both coercive and normative pressures from the country's key institutional actors and the government. The findings underline the dominant power of the Sri Lankan government (Aneez and Sirilal, 2011) , in certain sectors propelling those MNEs to adopt community CSR initiatives which are large in scale, more long-term oriented and in partnership with government agencies (see Table 4 ). Stronger normative pressure emanates from NGOs and trade associations, steering the businesses towards adopting more participative approaches and resulting in the MNEs engaging in community CSR initiatives as a way of fulfilling their social and professional obligations. We now turn to reviewing the internal legitimacy-seeking behaviour of the surveyed firms.
Internal Legitimacy-seeking behaviour and CSR
We analysed the legitimacy-seeking behaviour of the ten companies using Oliver's (1991) five strategies responses discussed above. However, we only found evidence for two of the five strategic responses: namely, 'manipulation' and 'compromise'.
Manipulation
We identified the use of manipulation as a legitimacy-seeking strategy by the three subsidiaries which were facing coercive pressures from the government. Due to their need to maintain legitimacy with the government, and thus minimise operational and political risk, these subsidiaries were keen to increase their engagement with the government by implementing CSR projects. They wanted to ensure that the government was aware of their contribution to the country not just from a financial or economic perspective, but also from a community-building angle. This would enable these subsidiaries to attempt to either prevent any negative future government actions (for example, such as the enactment of new laws for nationalisation of certain MNEs, the restriction of their business practices and the opening up monopolised markets to competition), or would, at least, help to ensure that the subsidiary is notified in advance of any such changes so that preventative measures could be taken to ensure their continued operations in the country. Recent events in these three sectors such as the temporary restrictions placed on imported milk products by the government (Field, 2014) , the increase in import duties on cement and milk products (Lanka Business Online (LBO), 2012), much stricter price controls on cement (LBO, 2011) and the introduction of graphic pictorial anti-smoking messages, under new labelling and packaging regulations for tobacco products in Sri Lanka (Kirinde, 2012) further indicate the increasing political risks which MNEs encounter. The use of manipulation shows the more proactive engagement that subsidiaries (which face increased political risk) have adopted to try to neutralise these risks by using CSR activities. See Table 6 for further examples of evidence relating to firms' use of a manipulation strategy.
-----------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE -----------------------------------------------

Compromise (or Collaboration)
A collaboration or 'compromise' strategy is also used by some subsidiaries to engage in legitimacyseeking behaviour with institutional actors to seek mutually beneficial CSR outcomes. However, this strategy tended to be voluntary and to address or respond to normative pressures. The collaboration between the firms and various governmental and non-governmental institutions occurred to achieve mutual goals related to a specific community initiative. For example, five of the subsidiaries (including the Tobacco Company) use a compromise strategy to work with the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce (i.e. Chamber), which promotes the achievement of the eight MDGs by its member organisations through their CSR activities (see Table 7 ).
-----------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE -----------------------------------------------
However, these five subsidiaries' level of collaboration is a result of how actively each one participates and the extent of resource contribution that they can make to these projects. As explained by the Assistant Manager of CSR at Banking Company 1, the subsidiaries encounter a variety of issues in relation to their collaboration with the Chamber. In addition to collaborating with the Chamber, we also found evidence that the subsidiaries also Table 8 lists further examples of community initiatives that these ten multinational enterprises' carried out in Sri Lanka.
The strategies that these companies have developed to enhance their acceptance and trust among external institutional actors, discussed above reflect how they are reconciling the tension between institutional pressures and legitimacy, by using their community initiatives. The manipulation strategy reflects the growth in public-private partnerships and the direct alignment of community initiatives with government requirements, whilst the collaboration strategy displays a type of voluntary engagement with important governmental and non-government institutional actors. The evidence that we have collected provides us with an initial understanding of how CSR activities, and more specifically community initiatives, have moved away from being a discretionary activity to a strategically important one.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The research undertaken for this paper aimed to explore how institutional pressures, viewed as a form of isomorphism, influence CSR practices among MNEs based in Sri Lanka, and how the researched companies in turn proactively seek legitimacy using their CSR activities. Our study reveals and highlights important findings related to a more instrumental use of CSR activities by companies, specifically to gain political advantage. To a certain extent it also provides an understanding about how national-institutional pressures influence a specific aspect of CSR (i.e. community initiatives) (Mondejar and Zhao, 2013) . Despite the stated importance of addressing community issues in CSR (Carroll, 1991) , the MNE subsidiaries we researched do this not simply because they want to do 'good' to society. Rather, they also have other intangible objectives, which we found were linked to the different institutional pressures encountered in Sri Lanka. The studies MNEs engaged in CSR strategically (Suchman, 1995) to build, to maintain, and to enhance their relationships and standing amongst the state and other important institutional stakeholders.
In relation to institutional pressures, we found clearly identifiable coercive and normative isomorphic pressures (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983) , arising from governmental and nongovernmental institutional actors. With regard to the former, rather than identifying clearly defined legal and regulatory structures as previous studies have done (Du and Vieira, 2012) , we identified more intangible, yet effective pressures adopted by the government, or 'informal rules of the game' (Peng, 2002; p 275) to get subsidiaries to engage in more long-term oriented CSR activities in Sri
Lanka. This is also in line with Zhao (2012) who also identified the significant pressures that powerful governments could exert upon companies' CSR activities. However, by showing that proactive government pressure could even occur in small developing countries (such as Sri Lanka), our findings raise questions about the ability of MNEs to manipulate host-country governments as stated in previous studies (Campbell et al., 2012) . Rather, our findings indicate that in order to manage increasing governmental pressures, MNEs can develop a cooperative relationship with government agencies. Community initiatives form an integral part of this relationship building process. It can be argued that MNEs' motivations for engaging in CSR are more politically than altruistically driven. Furthermore, we contend that the MNEs anticipate that by undertaking CSR strategies and community initiatives that they can pre-empt or circumvent detrimental government action, such as unfavourable or adverse regulatory changes, and may even be able to directly influence government policies (Mondejar and Zhao, 2013) to their advantage.
In relation to normative pressures, our findings showed that these were mostly directed towards the 'substance' of MNEs community initiatives, with non-governmental actors using their standing within the host-country to do so opportunistically (Oliver, 1991) . The MNEs in our study managed the normative pressures by cooperating with these institutional actors, using a partnership approach towards the implementation of community initiatives. While this is mostly in line with previous studies, which have examined the use of collaborative partnerships as an effective way to implement CSR (See Seitanidi and Crane, 2009; Seitandi and Ryan, 2007) , our findings also reveal that MNEs do so when they are able to actively control the partnership, thus enabling them to gain social approval and legitimisation within the host-country.
Although our study did indicate evidence of the above-mentioned normative pressures, it was surprising that cultural and religious pressures, which have been previously identified as normative pressures (Blasco and Zalner, 2010) , were not pinpointed by the subsidiary managers as being more important. We also unable to discernible any mimetic isomorphic pressures. This may be due in part to the fact that all of these ten MNE subsidiaries dominated their specific industries in Sri Lanka, and were market-leaders. Therefore, mimicking local competitors may not be a priority for them.
This finding differs greatly from studies which have identified mimetic pressures often superseding normative and coercive pressures on MNE CSR practices (Amran and Haniffa, 2011) .
Significantly, the two legitimacy-seeking strategies that we identified, while being similar to Oliver's (1991) , strategic responses to institutional pressures, are also different as we place CSR at the very core of these strategies. We show that CSR activities can be an important tool by which companies implement strategic responses to manage external institutional pressures and ultimately gain legitimacy. While Oliver's (Ibid.) strategic responses have been explored by others and remains a key contribution towards examining structure and agency in neo-institutional theory (Fransen, 2013) , our findings extend these identified strategic responses to the political CSR view, which has been gaining momentum in recent years. The political CSR literature has extended firmlevel arguments focusing on corporate citizenship theory (Matten and Crane, 2005) and the broadened the corporate citizenship concept (Valente and Crane, 2010 ) to a more global-level construct (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2001) , which contends that MNEs have become important political actors at the global level of governance (Detomasi, 2007; Matten and Crane, 2005; Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2006) . Based on our findings, we argue that concentrating on firm-level political CSR is also important, due to the direct impact it has on MNE CSR activities in developing countries, as is shown in this case.
Politically speaking, CSR efforts can aid MNEs in building local legitimacy and strong local relationships with host governments, and clearly what a MNE does or does not do in terms of CSR activity has competitive and political implications (Detomasi, 2007) . The evidence suggests that
MNEs are more likely to use CSR as 'political tool' to achieve objectives related to the preservation of societal legitimacy, to maintain flexibility in dealing with demands of host governments, and to prevent negative policy that might harm their competitiveness, and eventually their business sustainability (Ibid.). This was clearly observable from the findings of this study, where such objectives were being fulfilled specifically by the use of the manipulation strategy.
The manipulation strategy also bears a close resemblance to Fooks et al's (2013) (Polishchuk, 2009; Vallentin and Murillo, 2012) .
Thus, we argue that subsidiaries of MNEs can take proactive steps to acquire legitimacy in the hostcountry, and suggest at least two kinds of such actions that they can undertake (See figure 2) .
Firstly, they can pursue strategies to align their CSR activities to those priority development goals and/or political agendas of the host-county government, thereby, using CSR as tool in their subsequent political strategies. Secondly, they could adopt strategies to identify important institutional actors, who can confer legitimisation upon the subsidiary, and then collaborate with these actors through CSR activities, thereby developing long-term productive relationships which could, in the future, assist the subsidiaries' survival in the country. Adopting these proactive strategies appear to be most important for those MNEs operating within industries where there are strong or direct government controls and those having to manage powerful institutional actors (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2001; Palazzo, G., & Richter, 2005) .
Research Limitations and Areas for Future Research
Despite revealing significant fresh empirical data about the CSR practices of MNEs in a developing country, this paper, of course, has limitations. Most particularly, it is non-generalizable beyond the context in which the data has been collected, as is common to case study research (Yin, 2009) . It also utilises data collected during a specific time period, which may not be indicative of the fluid "For us we can't do anything in Sri Lanka without the support of government institutions. Anything to do with health or nutrition, we need the Ministry of Health's permission... so what do is to partner with the Ministry for our nutrition programme because you can't approach, you can't even distribute, you can't do any awareness unless the Health Ministry gives the green light... the government, for us is a key stakeholder...and if we don't have a good strategic corporate response plan we can't show the government how we are a nutritional and diary expert...so the day the government tells us to leave the country, they will know that they are losing a nutrition company from Sri Lanka that means from whom are they going to get that expertise from? So that's where we come in, they have to see that we support the nutrition in this country....so we want to be seen by the government as nutrition and diary expert. So that is why we helped the government to prepare a dairy development policy. Any food company has to have good relationship with the government because it affects people. "We do try to do large projects in Sri Lanka, like our 'global hand washing day' but then we usually get the government ministry on board and take them as a partner on this journey ... so if there is an opportunity they (the government) must also take and see it as a win-win situation" (Consumer Activations Manager, Consumer Company 1)
"When we see areas where we can work in, for example when we started with the water stewardship project there was a serious drought and people were suffering quite a lot. We took the initiative and wanted to play the leadership in water and we actually linked up with UNDP and got involved in two big projects, so I would say although NGOs can pressure us we also evaluate whether the issue is relevant for us and also whether we have resources to engage in it" (Vice-President Human Resources, Consumer Company 2)
Source: Authors 
